Graduate Diploma in Law (GDL) Criminal Law Syllabus

State the elements of diminished responsibility (s.2 Homicide Act 1957, as amended).

D must suffer from (1) an abnormality of mental functioning, (2) arising from a recognised medical condition, which (3) substantially impaired D's ability to understand the nature of conduct, form a rational judgment, or exercise self-control, and (4) provides an explanation for the killing.

State the three components of the loss of control defence (ss.54–55 Coroners and Justice Act 2009).

(1) D's killing resulted from a loss of self-control; (2) caused by a qualifying trigger (fear of serious violence and/or things said/done giving a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged); (3) a person of D's sex and age with normal tolerance and self-restraint might have reacted similarly.

Which triggers are excluded from the loss of control defence?

Sexual infidelity is excluded as a qualifying trigger (s.55(6)(c)), as is a desire for revenge (s.54(4)). A considered desire for revenge negates the defence even if there was a loss of control.

Does the loss of control defence require the loss of control to be sudden?

No. Unlike the old common law provocation defence, s.54(2) expressly states the loss of self-control need not be sudden, allowing for a 'slow burn' (relevant in cases of abused defendants).

Name the two main forms of involuntary manslaughter.

Unlawful act (constructive) manslaughter and gross negligence manslaughter. (Reckless manslaughter is sometimes treated as a third, narrower category.)

State the four elements of unlawful act (constructive) manslaughter.

(1) D committed an unlawful act (a crime, not an omission); (2) the act was dangerous — a sober and reasonable person would foresee some risk of harm (R v Church); (3) the act caused death; (4) D had the mens rea for the underlying unlawful act.

What is the test for 'dangerousness' in unlawful act manslaughter?

The objective Church test: the unlawful act must be such that all sober and reasonable people would inevitably recognise it as subjecting the victim to the risk of some harm (physical harm, not mere emotional disturbance).

State the four (Adomako) elements of gross negligence manslaughter.

(1) D owed the victim a duty of care; (2) D breached that duty; (3) the breach caused death; (4) the breach was so gross as to be criminal (R v Adomako). A serious and obvious risk of death must be reasonably foreseeable (R v Rose/Broughton).

What is the maximum sentence for the s.18 OAPA 1861 offence, and what distinguishes it from s.20?

Section 18 (wounding/causing GBH with intent) carries life imprisonment. It differs from s.20 by its mens rea: s.18 requires specific intent to cause GBH (or to resist arrest), whereas s.20 requires only intention or recklessness as to some harm.

State the actus reus and mens rea of assault (common assault).

Actus reus: causing the victim to apprehend immediate and unlawful personal violence. Mens rea: intention or recklessness as to causing that apprehension. No physical contact is required.

State the actus reus and mens rea of battery.

Actus reus: the infliction of unlawful force on another (any unlawful touching, however slight). Mens rea: intention or recklessness as to the application of unlawful force.

What must be proved for assault occasioning actual bodily harm (s.47 OAPA 1861)?

An assault or battery (with its mens rea) that occasions (causes) actual bodily harm — harm that is more than trifling/transient (R v Miller). No additional mens rea as to the ABH is required (R v Savage; Parmenter).

Define 'wound' and 'grievous bodily harm' for s.20 and s.18 OAPA 1861.

A 'wound' requires a break in the continuity of both layers of skin (JCC v Eisenhower). 'Grievous bodily harm' means 'really serious harm' (DPP v Smith); it can be assessed cumulatively and includes serious psychiatric injury (R v Burstow).

Provide a 'ladder' ranking the non-fatal offences from least to most serious.

Assault / battery (summary) → s.47 ABH (assault occasioning actual bodily harm) → s.20 (malicious wounding/GBH) → s.18 (wounding/GBH with intent). Seriousness rises with the harm and the required mens rea.

State the definition of theft under s.1 Theft Act 1968.

A person is guilty of theft if he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it.

List the five elements of theft and the relevant sections of the Theft Act 1968.

(1) Appropriation (s.3); (2) Property (s.4); (3) Belonging to another (s.5); (4) Dishonesty (s.2); (5) Intention to permanently deprive (s.6). The first three form the actus reus; the last two the mens rea.

How is 'appropriation' defined, and can it occur with the owner's consent?

Appropriation is any assumption of the rights of an owner (s.3). It can occur even where the owner consents to the taking (R v Gomez), and even where there is a valid gift (R v Hinks).

What is the modern test for dishonesty in theft?

The objective test in Ivey v Genting Casinos (confirmed for criminal law by R v Barton & Booth): ascertain D's actual knowledge/belief as to the facts, then decide whether D's conduct was dishonest by the standards of ordinary decent people. (This replaced the second limb of R v Ghosh.)

Name the three situations under s.2(1) Theft Act 1968 where D is NOT dishonest.

A belief that: (a) D has a legal right to deprive the other; (b) the other would have consented if they knew; or (c) the owner cannot be found by taking reasonable steps. Also, willingness to pay does not preclude dishonesty (s.2(2)).

State the definition and elements of robbery (s.8 Theft Act 1968).

Robbery is theft where, immediately before or at the time of stealing and in order to steal, D uses force on a person or puts/seeks to put any person in fear of being then and there subjected to force. There must be a complete theft plus force used to steal.

State the two forms of burglary under s.9(1)(a) and s.9(1)(b) Theft Act 1968.

s.9(1)(a): entering a building/part as a trespasser with intent to steal, inflict GBH, or do unlawful damage. s.9(1)(b): having entered as a trespasser, stealing/attempting to steal, or inflicting/attempting GBH. The intent timing differs: at entry for (a), after entry for (b).

What are the elements of handling stolen goods (s.22 Theft Act 1968)?

Dishonestly receiving stolen goods, or dishonestly undertaking/assisting in their retention, removal, disposal or realisation (or arranging to do so), by or for another, knowing or believing the goods to be stolen. It must be otherwise than in the course of stealing.

What is the difference between 'knowing' and 'believing' goods are stolen for handling?

'Knowing' means D has actual, firsthand certainty the goods are stolen. 'Believing' is less — D's mind, on the information available, accepts the goods are probably stolen even without certainty. Mere suspicion is insufficient (R v Hall).

Name the three ways of committing fraud under the Fraud Act 2006.

Section 2: fraud by false representation; section 3: fraud by failing to disclose information where there is a legal duty; section 4: fraud by abuse of position. Each requires dishonesty and an intent to make a gain or cause a loss.

State the elements of fraud by false representation (s.2 Fraud Act 2006).

D dishonestly makes a false (untrue/misleading) representation, knowing it is or might be false, intending thereby to make a gain for himself/another or cause loss/risk of loss to another. The offence is complete on making the representation; no gain or victim reliance is needed.

State the elements of making off without payment (s.3 Theft Act 1978).

D, knowing that payment on the spot is required or expected, dishonestly makes off from the spot without having paid, with intent to avoid payment of the amount due. 'On the spot' covers e.g. petrol, restaurant meals, taxi fares.

State the basic offence of criminal damage (s.1(1) Criminal Damage Act 1971).

D, without lawful excuse, destroys or damages property belonging to another, intending to do so or being reckless as to whether such property would be destroyed or damaged.

What is aggravated criminal damage (s.1(2) Criminal Damage Act 1971) and how does it differ from the basic offence?

Destroying/damaging property (which may be D's own) intending or being reckless as to endangering the life of another by the damage. It does not require the property to belong to another, requires the additional life-endangerment element, and carries life imprisonment.

What lawful excuses are provided by s.5 Criminal Damage Act 1971?

D has a lawful excuse if he honestly believed (a) the owner had or would have consented, or (b) the damage was necessary to protect his or another's property in immediate need of protection and the means were reasonable. The belief need only be honest, even if unreasonable (Jaggard v Dickinson).

Name the three inchoate offences and their statutory sources.

Attempt (Criminal Attempts Act 1981, s.1), conspiracy (Criminal Law Act 1977, s.1, plus common law conspiracies), and encouraging or assisting crime (Serious Crime Act 2007, ss.44–46, which replaced incitement).

State the actus reus and mens rea of a criminal attempt (s.1 Criminal Attempts Act 1981).

Actus reus: D does an act that is more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence (R v Gullefer). Mens rea: an intention to commit the full offence (R v Whybrow — attempted murder requires intent to kill, not merely GBH).

Can a person be liable for attempting the impossible?

Yes. Under s.1(2)–(3) Criminal Attempts Act 1981, D may be guilty of attempt even where commission of the full offence is impossible, judged on the facts as D believed them to be (R v Shivpuri).

State the elements of statutory conspiracy (s.1 Criminal Law Act 1977).

An agreement between two or more persons to pursue a course of conduct that will necessarily amount to or involve the commission of an offence if carried out as intended. There must be agreement plus intention that the offence be committed.

How does insanity operate as a defence (the M'Naghten Rules)?

It is presumed D is sane. To establish insanity D must prove that at the time, by reason of a defect of reason caused by a disease of the mind, he did not know the nature and quality of his act, or did not know it was wrong. The verdict is 'not guilty by reason of insanity'.

Distinguish insane automatism from non-insane automatism.

Insane automatism arises from an internal cause/disease of the mind (e.g. epilepsy, diabetes — hyperglycaemia) → special verdict. Non-insane automatism arises from an external cause (e.g. a blow, insulin — hypoglycaemia) → complete acquittal.

How does voluntary intoxication affect liability, distinguishing specific and basic intent crimes?

Voluntary intoxication may negate the mens rea of a specific intent crime (e.g. murder), reducing it to the basic intent equivalent (DPP v Majewski). It is no defence to a basic intent crime, because becoming voluntarily intoxicated is itself reckless.

What is the relevance of a child's age to criminal capacity in England and Wales?

The age of criminal responsibility is 10 (s.50 Children and Young Persons Act 1933). A child under 10 cannot be criminally liable. The rebuttable presumption of doli incapax for children aged 10–13 was abolished by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.

Is duress of circumstances/necessity a defence to murder?

No. Duress (by threats or of circumstances) is never a defence to murder or attempted murder (R v Howe; R v Gotts). Necessity also could not justify killing an innocent person in R v Dudley and Stephens.

State the two-stage (Graham) test for the defence of duress by threats.

(1) Subjective: was D compelled to act because he reasonably believed he faced death or serious injury? (2) Objective: would a sober person of reasonable firmness sharing D's characteristics have responded in the same way? (R v Graham; R v Hasan).

Distinguish principals, joint principals, and accessories (secondary parties).

A principal directly commits the actus reus with the required mens rea. Joint principals each satisfy the actus reus together. An accessory (secondary party) aids, abets, counsels or procures the offence (s.8 Accessories and Abettors Act 1861) but does not commit the principal offence.

What is the current law on accessory liability following R v Jogee (2016)?

R v Jogee abolished 'parasitic accessory liability'. To be liable as an accessory, D must intend to assist or encourage the principal's offence and must intend the principal to act with the required mens rea. Foresight of the crime is only evidence of intent, not a substitute for it.